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REACHING ACROSS THE THRESHOLD OF
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT—
WHY PAYTON V. NEW YORK
SHOULD BE INTERPRETED BROADLY
Caroline Hunt*
IN United States v. Allen, the Second Circuit faced the topic of a cir-cuit split and held that in order to determine the constitutionality of“across the threshold” warrantless arrests, courts need only look to
the location of the arrested person.1 In a landmark case, Payton v. New
York, the Supreme Court held that several New York statutes, which “au-
thorize[d] police officers to enter a private residence without a warrant”
to make a routine felony arrest, were in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.2 While this holding provided some guidance, it left several pivotal
questions unanswered and has led to a significant split among the federal
circuit courts as to what the proper application of the rule in Payton
should be.3 In light of the growing tension between police officers and the
public, it is essential that law enforcement officers are given clear guide-
lines. The Second Circuit was correct in its holding because a broad appli-
cation of Payton encourages law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant
or seek other avenues for effecting an arrest, simplifies the necessary cri-
teria for effecting a constitutional across the threshold warrantless arrest,
and ensures that Fourth Amendment protections are not violated.4
In 2012, four police officers went to the apartment of Dennis B. Allen
to arrest him for an assault that occurred a few days before.5 Upon arriv-
ing at Allen’s apartment, the officers summoned Allen to the front door
and, remaining inside the threshold, Allen spoke calmly with the officers
for several minutes.6 Although Allen insisted that he had not committed
any assault, an officer nonetheless informed him that he was under ar-
rest.7 Allen asked the officers if he could return inside to put on some
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1. United States v. Allen, 813 F.3d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 2016).
2. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 574, 576 (1980).
3. See id. at 588–89.
4. Allen, 813 F.3d at 89.
5. Id. at 78.
6. Id. at 79.
7. Id.
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shoes and inform his daughter that he was leaving.8 The police agreed to
Allen’s request, but only on the condition that Allen be accompanied by
an officer.9 After following Allen into his house, law enforcement officers
reported that they observed drug paraphernalia lying out in the open.10
Additionally, when instructed to empty his pockets, Allen produced
seven bags of marijuana.11 Allen was subsequently escorted outside,
handcuffed, and taken to the police station.12
Following Allen’s arrest, officers obtained a search warrant based on
the drugs in Allen’s possession.13 A search of Allen’s apartment revealed
a handgun, and Allen was then “rearrested . . . on the federal charge of
being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1).”14 A federal grand jury indicted Allen for the felon in pos-
session charge.15 After his indictment, Allen moved to suppress both the
firearm that the officers found and statements he made following that
discovery, “contending that both were fruits of a warrantless in-home ar-
rest in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”16
After analyzing precedent from the Second Circuit, the Supreme
Court, and other federal courts of appeals, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Vermont denied Allen’s suppression motion and held that Al-
len’s arrest did not violate Fourth Amendment protections.17 In holding
“that the pivotal inquiry is whether law enforcement crossed the thresh-
old of the home in order to effectuate the arrest,” the court found that
Allen was, indeed, subjected to a warrantless across the threshold arrest
because he remained inside his apartment while speaking with police.18
However, citing California v. Hodari D., the court held that Allen’s arrest
was constitutional nonetheless because “Allen had submitted to the of-
ficer’s authority” by asking if he could return inside to put on shoes and
speak with his daughter.19 Thus, despite acknowledging that “the case
presented a ‘close[ ] question,’” the court determined that the rule in
Payton should not apply.20 As a result, “Allen entered a conditional
guilty plea to the felon in possession charge, reserving his right to appeal
the denial of the suppression motion.”21 After the district court entered










17. Id. at 80.
18. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
19. Id.; see also 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991).
20. Allen, 813 F.3d at 80 (alteration in original).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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Relying on its own binding precedent set forth in United States v. Reed,
the Second Circuit vacated Allen’s conviction and reversed the denial of
the suppression motion.23 In so doing, the Second Circuit set forth a
broad interpretation of the rule in Payton, holding that, in the absence of
exigent circumstances, when “officers summon a suspect to the door of
his home and place [the suspect] under arrest while he remains within his
home,” such an arrest is unconstitutional.24 In rejecting the approach
taken by other circuits, the court held that the question of whether the
officers physically crossed the threshold of the home is irrelevant, and
any evaluation of “constructive” or “coercive” entry is unnecessary.25
The Allen court held that when a person is in his home, his Fourth
Amendment rights are violated the moment a warrantless arrest occurs,
regardless of the show of force demonstrated by the arresting officers.26
Additionally, the Allen court noted that this broad application of the rule
in Payton “provides clear guidance to law enforcement, avoids undue
complexities and perverse incentives to householders not to open their
doors to inquiring police officers, and most importantly, ensures that the
Fourth Amendment protections, which are at their zenith in the home,
are adequately protected.”27
While some circuits have interpreted the rule in Payton narrowly, hold-
ing that Payton only applies to those instances where an arresting officer
physically crosses the threshold into the home of the arrested person,
others have interpreted Payton much more broadly, holding that “it is the
location of the arrested person, and not the arresting agents, that deter-
mines whether an arrest occurs within a home.”28 These circuits have jus-
tified such a broad interpretation of the Payton rule by “rely[ing] on the
legal fiction of constructive or coercive entry,” arguing that when arrest-
ing agents use such force or strength of commands so as “to coerce the
occupant [to come] outside of the home, they ‘accomplish [ ] the same
thing’ and achieve the same effect as an actual entry . . . .”29 To determine
if the circumstances amount to such an entry, these courts look to a list of
23. Id. at 88–89; see 572 F.2d 412, 423 (2d. Cir. 1978) (“To be arrested in the home
involves not only the invasion attendant to all arrests but also an invasion of the sanctity of
the home. This is simply too substantial an invasion to allow without a warrant, at least in
the absence of exigent circumstances, even when it is accomplished under statutory author-
ity and when probable cause is clearly present.”).
24. Allen, 813 F.3d at 88–89; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587–88 (1980)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment “prohibits the police from making a warrantless and
nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home in order to make a routine felony arrest.”).
25. Allen, 813 F.3d at 88–89.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 89.
28. Id. at 81 (quoting United States v. Reeves, 524 F.3d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 2008))
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Knight v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d 1272, 1277 (11th Cir.
2002); United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1386–88 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Fisher v. City of San Jose, 558 F.3d
1069, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc); United States v. Saari, 272 F.3d 804, 807–08 (6th
Cir. 2001).
29. Allen, 813 F.3d at 81 (quoting United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1166 (6th
Cir. 1984)).
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factors, including the number of police officers present, the time of day,
the force of the commands, and whether the officers’ weapons were bran-
dished or holstered.30
Although the Second Circuit court acknowledged that its holding offers
the broadest interpretation of the Payton rule so far, the court offered an
exhaustive list of rationales for this interpretation.31 First, the Allen court
noted that the question of when a person is within his home, outside of
his home, or on the threshold of his home, is already a fact-intensive in-
quiry.32 Added to this byzantine inquiry is another complicated factor
analysis of determining whether authorities’ show of force rises to a level
of constructive entry sufficient to trigger the Payton rule.33 Additionally,
the court noted that, “[a]n arrested person is, and should be, arrested:
When the police are authorized to take a person into custody, and under-
take to do so, they must have the authority to make the arrest effective if
the suspect refuses to comply.”34 Thus, any rule that allowed officers to
effect a warrantless across the threshold arrest, but then allowed a “per-
son to refuse the arrest simply by closing the door, would . . . undermine
the authority of the police” and potentially create violent conflict.35 Fur-
thermore, the court noted that if such a rule were adopted, “perverse
incentives” might arise for homeowners to refuse to open the door to law
enforcement.36 Obviously any rule which discourages cooperation with
law enforcement is potentially very problematic, and the court recognized
that such practical consequences would likely occur.37 Finally, the court
noted that any command of an officer is a “sufficient exercise of authority
to require the suspect to comply,” whether or not the command is accom-
panied by a show of force, and that “[s]uch a command projects the au-
thority of the police into the home, and requires a warrant under
Payton.”38
Because the issue at hand is one of constitutional rights, the Second
Circuit was correct in holding that the rule in Payton should be applied
broadly and should encompass all arrests where the arrested person re-
mains in their home, regardless of the show of force demonstrated by
police.39 The solution proposed by the Second Circuit is not unreasonable
or unduly burdensome upon law enforcement—the need to effect an ar-
rest of a person within their home is not as great as some would make it
seem.40 Under the rule promulgated by the Second Circuit, officers can
still arrest a suspect in any public place or enter the home of a suspect in
30. Id. at 88.
31. See id. at 81–82.
32. Id. at 88.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 86 (emphasis in original).
35. Id.
36. See id. at 89.
37. Id. at 87 (quoting United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 n.9 (2d Cir. 1978)).
38. Id. at 88.
39. See id. at 88–89.
40. Id. at 87.
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order to effect an arrest under “exigent circumstances.”41 The Supreme
Court has upheld exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement when police officers were in “hot pursuit of a fleeing felon,”
when officers reasonably believed that the suspect was destroying evi-
dence, and when there was an ongoing emergency, such as a house fire.42
Additionally, it is important to note that it is rarely the case that officers
are unable to procure a warrant, but rather, that officers choose to effect
an across the threshold warrantless arrest to save the extra effort and
time that procuring a warrant takes.43 The Second Circuit noted this,
pointing out that “[d]espite having nearly two days and ample probable
cause, the officers did not seek a warrant for Allen’s arrest.”44 Further-
more, advances in technology and the availability of qualified magistrates
at virtually all hours of the day has made the process of procuring a war-
rant substantially more efficient. As the Supreme Court and the Second
Circuit have noted, it is critical that the added burden placed on law en-
forcement of requiring a warrant be viewed in the proper perspective—
when an agent of the government attempts to violate the sanctity of a
man’s home, the simple requirement of obtaining a warrant from an unbi-
ased third-party does not seem too high.45 The Supreme Court has long
held that “the warrant procedure minimizes the danger of needless intru-
sions” into the sanctity of a man’s home, and thus, should be properly
utilized to ensure that probable cause exists before depriving a person of
their individual liberties.46
Although seeking a warrant is certainly an added burden on law en-
forcement, the tensions existing between the police and the public in to-
day’s society demand that clarity and efficiency be brought to police
procedure. By providing police with clear, black and white rules, there is
no longer a need for police officers to delve into tricky questions of fact
and circumstance. The Second Circuit’s rule protects law enforcement of-
ficers from being put in the position of making judgment calls and elimi-
nates the inconsistencies created by basing the constitutionality of an
arrest on minute details, such as the time of day or the force of an of-
ficer’s statements. By simply holding that any warrantless arrest of a per-
son while the person is in their home is unconstitutional, the gray areas
41. Id.
42. Id. at 83 n.9; see Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (“A burning building
clearly presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry ‘reason-
able.’”); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976) (“we have recognized the
right of police . . . to make a warrantless entry to arrest . . . . [in cases] involving a true ‘hot
pursuit’ . . . .”); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967) (stating that police “acted
reasonably when they entered the house and began to search for” an armed robber);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770–71 (1966) (stating that officer “reasonably [ ]
believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain
a warrant, under the circumstances, threated ‘the destruction of evidence.’”) (citation
omitted).
43. See Allen, 813 F.3d at 78.
44. Id.
45. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588–89 (1980); Allen, 813 F.3d at 81.
46. Payton, 445 U.S. at 586.
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between permissible and impermissible conduct become much more
clear. The case-by-case method of evaluating an officer’s conduct against
standards for coercive or constructive entry leaves too much ambiguity in
the law. The Supreme Court, while examining the bounds of the Fourth
Amendment’s protection in New York v. Belton, described the problem
that often arises when complex tests are used to determine the constitu-
tionality of actions on a case-by-case basis.47 In Belton, the Supreme
Court held that a clear rule was necessary in order to ensure that the
lawfulness of a search did not turn on “‘[a] highly sophisticated set of
rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing
of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions.’”48 Likewise, the same is true
of warrantless arrests; the determination of constructive or coercive entry
requires too much of law enforcement officers and does not present indi-
viduals with a clear picture of their rights. In order to avoid heated con-
frontations, confusion, and undue influence, it is essential that both law
enforcement and citizens are aware of what qualifies as a constitutional
arrest.
Furthermore, although many courts have held that Payton prohibits
only warrantless entry into the home and that a broad interpretation is
inconsistent with the text of the Fourth Amendment, that conclusion fails
when the Payton rule is viewed in practical terms.49 As in Allen, individu-
als who open their front door to speak with inquiring police officers
rarely expect to be subsequently arrested and are often unprepared to
leave their home; consequently, such individuals must return inside.50 At
this point, having already been placed under arrest, individuals are often
escorted into their homes by police officers, allowing the officers physical
entry and the opportunity to seize any and all evidence that is in plain
view.51 In Allen, the arrest was made without physical entry, but the con-
stitutional ramifications remain the same: the arresting officers were
given warrantless entry into Allen’s residence and were able to search a
limited area without obtaining a warrant.52 This “‘physical entry of the
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amend-
ment is directed,’” and no rule which allows for such an entry to be ef-
fected, even in a roundabout way, should stand.53
Moreover, the Second Circuit’s holding is a clear step towards a uni-
form rule. Circuit splits such as this allow for the Constitution to take on
47. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981), abrogated by Davis v. United States,
564 U.S. 229 (2011).
48. Id. (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” versus “Standardized
Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S. CT. REV. 127, 142).
49. Cf., e.g., United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1386 (7th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987); McKinney v. George, 726 F.2d 1183,
1188 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1015 (9th Cir. 1983).
50. See Allen, 813 F.3d at 79.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585–86 (1980) (quoting United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
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different interpretations in different jurisdictions. While the Supreme
Court’s holding in Payton certainly clarified the question to an extent, the
practical application of the rule remains problematic.54 The Second Cir-
cuit’s holding was based in large part on the binding precedent set forth
in Reed, which the Supreme Court expressly approved, noting that the
decision was “persuasive and in accord with this Court’s Fourth Amend-
ment decisions.”55 Thus, other circuits should follow the Second Circuit
in adopting this rule. The need for uniform application of the Constitu-
tion’s protections and uniformity in the guidelines provided to law en-
forcement officers, coupled with the express approval of this rule by the
Supreme Court, seems to be strong evidence that this rule should be ex-
clusively adopted.
The Second Circuit’s unique interpretation of the Payton rule certainly
provides practical challenges for law enforcement officers and increases
the burden on the judiciary to provide warrants in an efficient and timely
manner. However, this approach provides the clearest guidelines for law
enforcement. In a time when the police are under strict scrutiny by the
public, clear rules and definitive answers are key to eliminating conflict
and keeping the peace.
54. See id. at 574; see also, e.g., Allen, 813 F.3d at 81.
55. Payton, 445 U.S. at 588–89; Allen, 813 F.3d at 81.
